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ABSTRACT
The axiological notions and assumptions are the necessary part of the analysis the application 
of law. Author of this article states the most basic axiological question, that is: how should a judicial 
decision be made? How should a court issue decisions, on what values should it be based, what is 
and what should be the aim of a decision? The research proposal to these questions is: equity, the 
equity of the decisions, equity in concreto. Characterizing the axiological bases of the application of 
law, one need to find a way which would take us to the best resolution. The court and the judge solve, 
after all, a certain case that exists in reality, and do not present alternative possibilities of choice. 
The court, while making a decision, makes a choice which should be driven by equity. After all, 
can we find any other values that would light our way? The judge should strive to find an equitable 
resolution, they should search for it and not reject it a priori. Justice should be treated as the pillar 
of equity, but equity is richer and greater.
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1. CATEGORY OF VALUE AS A RESEARCH NOTION
Axiology (from Greek: aksía – value; áksios – valuable) is the study of values, 
the theory of value, the philosophy of value.
The category of value found its place in philosophy relatively late. The word 
“value” (in German Wert) gained the status of a philosophical term in the 19th 
century, mainly thanks to Neo-Kantians.1 The main originator was Immanuel 
Kant, who separated the „is” (Sein) from the “ought” (Sollen).2
1 The theory of value as a new, separate branch of philosophy was suggested as late as at the 
turn of the 19th century by Brentanists and Neo-Kantians. Cf. A.B. Stępień, Wstęp do filozofii, Lublin 
2007, p. 102.
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The first to introduce the category of value into philosophy was Rudolf Her-
mann Lotze (1817–1881)3. The research of value as something precious, worthy, 
due, obliging – gave rise to axiology (the theory of value). The term “axiology” 
was introduced by Paul Lapie (1902) and Eduard von Hartmann (1908).4 The first 
study in the field of axiology is said to have been Christian von Ehrenfels’s treatise 
System der Werttheorie from 1893.
Axiology-related issues have interested philosophers and other academics 
since ancient times, but for many centuries, before the terms “value” or “axiol-
ogy” became popular, the notion of “good” was in use instead of the notion of 
“value”. We can say that the notion of “value” is the contemporary counterpart of 
the term “good” (bonum).5
The term “value” had appeared earlier only in economics, in reference to eco-
nomic phenomena: the value of something was its price. Such was the meaning 
of the word aksía (value) as used in ancient Greece. However, the word was also 
used to denote someone’s majesty, which would place it closer to today’s meaning 
of the word “dignity”.6 
Nowadays, the category of value is exceptionally widespread. The word is 
used in informal speech, journalism (although sometimes probably thoughtless-
ly), academic terminology (the notion of value appears in philosophy, ethics, eco-
nomics, psychology, sociology, jurisprudence and other fields of study).7 Among 
values, we can distinguish: moral, economic, aesthetic, political, world-view and 
praxeological values.8
The term “value” is connected to a whole family of notions that are some-
times close to one another, but sometimes completely different. Defining “value” 
is, therefore, extremely difficult. Usually, it is claimed that the notion of value is 
3 R.H. Lotze separated values from beings. Beings exist (sind) while values have a meaning 
(gelten). Cf. D. Oko, Lotze Rudolf Hermann, [in:] Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, Vol. VI, Lu-
blin 2005, p. 523.
4 Cf. H. Kiereś, Wartości teoria, [in:] Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii, Vol. IX, Lublin 2008, 
p. 708.
5 W. Tatarkiewicz writes: “[…] the term «good» (Latin: bonum) […] appeared often in ancient 
and medieval treatises and meant more or less the same as «value» as it is used by today’s writers. 
In Anglo-Saxon countries «good» is used alongside and even more often than «value» to this day”. 
Cf. W. Tatarkiewicz, Pojęcie wartości, czyli co historyk filozofii ma do zakomunikowania historyko-
wi sztuki, [in:] Pisma z etyki i teorii szczęścia, Wrocław – Warsaw – Cracow 1992, p. 75. Cf. also: 
A.B. Stępień, op. cit., pp. 102−103.
6 Cf. M. Piechowiak, Filozofia praw człowieka. Prawa człowieka w świetle ich międzynarodo-
wej ochrony, Lublin 1999, p. 210.
7 Cf. R. Ruyer, Philosophie de la valeur, Paris 1952, p. 6.
8 This list is by no means exhaustive. There are many typologies of value. For example, Max 
Scheler distinguished four large classes of values: pleasure, life, holy and spirit. The values of the 
spirit include moral as well as cognitive and aesthetic values. Cf. W. Tatarkiewicz, Historia filozofii, 
Vol. III, Warsaw 1981, p. 221.
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something fundamental, indefinable.9 We can, however, enumerate some basic 
meanings of value: 1) that what is judged positively by a human being (something 
precious), 2) that what is in accordance with nature, 3) that what ought to be, 
4) that what is the object of desire, 5) that what demands coming into being, 6) that 
what is an aim of human aspirations, 7) that what fulfils certain needs, 8) that what 
demands fulfilment, 9) ideas, 10) absolute good, 11) that what obliges the receiver 
or appeals to them, 12) everything that is considered to be good.10
 In principle, all axiologies (theories of value) admit that value is something 
advantageous (positive) and obliging (creating obligations).11
2. CREATIVE INFLUENCE OF VALUES CONNECTED 
WITH THE EQUITABLE LAW
After the above introductory remarks, let us get to the heart of the matter. 
The subject of the axiology of law is, above all, moral values. In principle, these 
values constitute the basis of law.12 But law itself is also a value and an object of 
axiological analyses. The axiology of law, presenting law as a value, allows us 
to understand the essence of law, studies the values that underlie law and those 
expressed in law, analyses values in both the creation and the application of law. 
When talking about axiological bases of the application of law, it is necessary 
to emphasize that such bases should be clear, certain, reliable and durable. There-
fore, the question is to find fundamental bases (fundamental values) which would 
support the processes of the application of law. We should not seek a temporary, 
short-term, ephemeral axiology, one that would be in any way imposed by history. 
Axiological bases of the application of law cannot be relativistic and should not be 
relativised. When considering axiological bases of the application of law, we can-
not think about instrumental values or, of course, formal values, i.e. the so-called 
inner values of the application of law13; we have to think about fundamental, uni-
versal values, which could constitute a reliable foundation for the decisions made 
in the application of law.
  9 A.B. Stępień, op. cit., p. 103.
10 Cf. Ibidem. Cf. also: A. Kojder, Godność i siła prawa. Szkice socjologiczno-prawne, Warsaw 
1995, pp. 159−160.
11 Cf. H. Kiereś, op. cit., p. 709.
12 Moral values are considered to play a special role among values. They are the most general 
and the most significant category. The opinion that moral values are incommensurable in compari-
son with all other values has prevailed for a long time. Maria Ossowska, emphasising the above, 
writes: “moral values have a completely different scale than other values do”. Cf. M. Ossowska, 
Podstawy nauki o moralności, Wrocław – Warsaw – Cracow 1994, p. 180.
13 Generally, it is assumed that the inner values are: legality, certainty, uniformity and effective-
ness of the application of law. 
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Such bases are provided by the theory of equitable law. But what is equitable 
law? And what values is it based on? The answer is: truth, good, justice, human 
dignity. We can say that the common denominator of the values mentioned above 
is the dignity of every human being. Such an understanding of equity concerns the 
processes of both the creation of law and its application.
Truth, good, justice, human dignity – these axiological bases of the existence 
of law, i.e. values from which law and its creation stem, can and should be, in fact, 
also the values behind the application of law. 
It is, therefore, necessary to explain the meaning of the given values. What is 
the sense of truth (Greek: alétheia, Latin: veritas, verum)? Here, the basic, clas-
sical understanding of truth is taken into consideration. Truth in cognitive sense 
(epistemological dimension of truth) is the adequacy of the intellectual percep-
tion and real things (veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei). It is the adequacy 
between the content of our perception and its object. 
When formulating (creating) norms, the truth about reality, including the truth 
about the existential dimension of a human being, should be the starting point for 
creating equitable law.
It is also necessary to emphasize that the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in its 
judgement of 12 September 2005 (SK 13/05, Orzecznictwo Trybunalu Konsty-
tucyjnego (OTK) (Official Digest), 2005, Series A, No. 8, item 91) assumed that 
truth is a normative notion and stated: “The legislative body in the preamble to 
the Constitution considers truth to be a universal value which forms the basis of 
the political system of the Republic of Poland”.14 The notion of truth is used by 
the legislative body also in other normative acts, for example in the Polish Code 
of Civil Procedure (art. 3 – “truthfully”, art. 252 – “untrue”), in the Polish Penal 
Code (art. 233 – “conceals the truth”, “gives false testimony”, art. 272 – “attesta-
tion of an untruth”).
Since modern times, and especially nowadays, various concepts of truth have 
been formulated, but in jurisprudence such formulations do not seem to have any 
purpose (except for formal, “judicial” truth). In the application of law, it seems 
that every judge intuitively knows what truth is, in the sense of conformity with 
the facts.
The decision that establishes factual circumstances is the result of cognitive 
reasoning15, which leads one to the recognition of the truth. What is meant here 
is a truthful description of the fragment of reality that constitutes factual circum-
stances.16 Therefore, it is necessary to establish factual circumstances according 
14 It is necessary to emphasize that it is assumed in the introduction to the 1997 Constitution of 
the Republic of Poland that there exist universal values: truth, justice, good and beauty.
15 Cf. M. Zieliński, Poznanie sądowe a poznanie naukowe, Poznań 1979, pp. 29−38.
16 Cf. A. Korybski, L. Leszczyński, A. Pieniążek, Wstęp do prawoznawstwa, Lublin 2010, 
pp. 153−155.
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to the reality. In the Polish law, the principle of material (objective, actual) truth 
dominates. It is expressed in art. 2 § 2 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure 
and art. 7 of the Polish Code of Administrative Procedure.
In the following part of this paper, the deliberations will consider mostly the 
judicial application of law. Therefore, it is necessary to emphasize now that the 
principle of objective truth expressed in art. 7 of the Polish Code of Administra-
tive Procedure is the chief principle of administrative procedure, which deeply 
influences its whole shape. From this principle arises the public administration’s 
obligation “to thoroughly inspect all factual circumstances linked to a given case, 
so as to create its actual image and obtain a basis for an accurate application of 
a regulation”17.
As for learning the truth in civil procedure (art. 3 of the Polish Code of Civil 
Procedure), after the amendments to the code (especially the repeal of art. 3 § 2 
of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure), there is a dispute among the procedural 
law scholars. The doctrine’s opinions on the existence of the principle of objective 
truth vary.18 
Without entering such disputes, we can ascertain that the requirement of truth 
in its classic, Aristotelian sense, in the application of, broadly speaking, private 
law, is not rigorous. However, it is necessary to emphasize that art. 3 of the Polish 
Code of Civil Procedure that is currently in force obliges the parties in the proce-
dure to speak the truth.19
17 W. Dawidowicz, Ogólne postępowanie administracyjne. Zarys systemu, Warsaw 1962, p. 108.
18 Krzysztof Knoppek claims that: “5 February 2005 is the last day of the era when the prin-
ciple of objective truth, also known as material truth, was in force in the Polish civil procedure”. 
K. Knoppek, Zmierzch zasady prawdy obiektywnej w procesie cywilnym, „Palestra” 2005, No. 1−2, 
p. 9. However, part of the doctrine defends the thesis on the existence of objective truth in Polish 
civil procedure. There are reasons for that, for example there are regulations that may oblige the 
court to find actual truth. Without taking up this question, we can agree with K. Knoppek’s opinion: 
“It is necessary to emphasize that the two principles – material and formal truth – do not have to 
constitute opposing categories. One has to be conscious of the fact that the legislative body, relieving 
the court of the obligation to find the objective truth, at the same time gives the parties and, through 
them, the court as well, the possibility to find the objective truth. The legislative body even encour-
ages the parties to endeavour to find the full, actual truth about a particular case, because the prize 
for such efforts would be winning the case. The parties’ trial of facts, in turn, is functionally linked to 
the basic and now chief principle of civil procedure, i.e. the principle of adversarial process. It is the 
principle of adversarial process that should lead to a situation in which the formal truth corresponds 
to the objective truth, and the legislative body gives the parties the necessary tools. It is, therefore, 
worth emphasizing that the Polish Code of Civil Procedure after the 2004 amendments does not 
exclude the possibility of finding the objective truth. However, it is sought by the parties and not by 
the courts”. Ibidem, pp. 13−14.
19 Breach of this obligation can “activate” certain regulations that lead to sanctions, even if 
indirectly (for example, art. 255 of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure in connection with art. 252 
and 253 of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure). 
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Moving on to good (Greek: agathón, Latin: bonum), is it worth emphasizing 
that it is meant here in the moral sense. We can ask the question: why good? The 
answers are manifold.
A human is the only being (as remarked by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics, 
and later in Politics20) that is able to distinguish the good from the evil and thanks 
to this ability can choose the good.
Let us also quote the first sentence of Nicomachean Ethics: “Every art and ev-
ery inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; 
and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things 
aim”.21 It is important to note that the Latin excerpt from this sentence: bonum est 
quod omnia appetunt has become a commonly accepted axiom.
There is another fact that influences the choice of good: as was mentioned ear-
lier, the general meaning of the word “value” was replaced with the word “good” 
throughout centuries. 
Moreover, we shall recall the well-known maxim by P.J. Celsus, mentioned 
by D. Ulpian at the beginning of Justinian’s Digest: “[…] ut eleganter Celsus 
definit, ius est ars boni et aequi” – as Celsus elegantly puts it, law is art of apply-
ing what is good and just.22 This formulation emphasizes not only that there exists 
a “moral element” in law, but also that law and morality stay in a close relation-
ship, in a universal synthesis.23 It is a general directive showing that good (bonum) 
and equity (aequum) are the fundamental values of law. In this paper, we assume 
a larger understanding of equity; however, by no means does it diminish the sig-
nificance of good.
Good in the moral meaning is human good and common good. 
We have to stress that the principle of common good is the fundamental, con-
stitutional, system-founding principle expressed in art. 1 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Poland currently in force.24 Therefore, good is a legal term that has 
20 In Politics, Aristotle writes: “And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of 
good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like”. Aristotle, Politics, trans. B. Jowett, Kitchener 1999, 
pp. 5−6.
21 Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, trans. W.D. Ross, Book I, Kitchener 1999, p. 1.
22 Ulpian, Digesta, 1, 1, 1. pr.
23 M. Kuryłowicz, while analysing ethical aspects of law in Roman jurists’ maxims, emphasizes 
the unity of ethics and law that is characteristic of Romans. Cf. M. Kuryłowicz, Etyka i prawo 
w sentencjach rzymskich jurystów, [in:] W kręgu problematyki władzy, państwa i prawa. Księga 
jubileuszowa w 70-lecie urodzin Profesora Henryka Groszyka, Lublin 1996, pp. 127−128. Cf. also: 
M. Kuryłowicz, A. Wiliński, Rzymskie prawo prywatne. Zarys wykładu, Warsaw 2008, p. 21.
24 The principle of common good mentioned in the first article of the Constitution of the Re-
public of Poland expresses the idea that the state should serve the citizens, and not the other way 
around. Common good is not opposed to individual good. The basic determinant of common good is 
human good. Cf. W. Dziedziak, Słuszność w prawie i prawa człowieka, [in:] Praktyka ochrony pra-
wa człowieka, ed. K. Machowicz, Vol. I, Lublin 2012, pp. 32−34. Cf. on the topic of understanding 
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its roots in philosophy. It appears also in many other regulations in the following 
example constructions: “good of the children”, “good of the family”, “for the 
good of the citizens”, “good faith”, “good practice”, “personal goods”, “property 
goods”. 
As for justice (Greek: dikaiosyne, Latin: iustitia), we assume its classical 
meaning: “giving to each his own” (suum cuique tribuere).25 The concise defini-
tion formulated by Ulpian is commonly known: “Iustitia est constans et perpetua 
voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi”.26
It is obvious that guaranteeing everyone what is due to them is a need and 
a necessity in social life. Justice is the foundation of social order. Law has to 
implement justice. Law has to be just. And what is truly just always corresponds 
to what is morally good.27 
The legislative bodies have to properly establish the principles of proportion-
ate, regular distribution of goods and the participation in the common good of the 
society. 
The idea (postulate) of justice is present in probably every legal system. How-
ever, it can be mistakenly understood, subjectivized, and thus, unfortunately, de-
formed, turned into an ornament or limited only to its formal aspect. Such justice 
becomes only a pretence.
Distributional justice (iustitia distributiva) concerning the distribution of 
goods and social burdens may be violated. And this can significantly hinder the 
administration of justice in the application of law.
As for judicial application of law, the axiological basis of such procedure 
might seem to be already settled in the Constitution. Usually, the main orientation 
is towards justice. According to the Polish Constitution (art. 175, section 1), jus-
tice is implemented by courts.28 The constitutional right to a fair trial is expressed 
in art. 45 section 1 of the Polish Constitution (“Everyone shall have the right to 
a fair and public hearing of his case, without undue delay, before a competent, 
impartial and independent court”).29 Also the basic acts of the international law 
stipulate the right to a fair hearing: art. 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights stipulates that everyone has the right to “a fair and public hearing by an 
common good: M. Piechowiak, Dobro wspólne jako fundament polskiego porządku konstytucyjne-
go, Warsaw 2012. 
25 The saying: “justice is giving to each his own” was known to Plato and Aristotle. 
26 Ulpian, Digesta, 1, 1, 10 pr.
27 Cf. J. Karp, Sprawiedliwość społeczna. Szkice ze współczesnej teorii konstytucjonalizmu 
i praktyki polskiego prawa ustrojowego, Cracow 2004, p. 137.
28 The implementation of justice is reserved to courts only. Cf. also art. 177 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Poland.
29 On the right to a trial, cf. e.g. E. Łętowska, Prawo do sądu – różnice perspektywy, [in:] Aurea 
praxis aurea theoria. Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Profesora Tadeusza Erecińskiego, eds. J. Gudow-
ski, K. Weitz, Vol. II, Warsaw 2011, pp. 2857−2885.
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independent and impartial tribunal”; art. 14 section 1 of the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates that “everyone shall be entitled to 
a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal”; also 
art. 6 section 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights exposes everyone’s 
right to “a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal”, which is described as the right to a just (reliable, equitable, 
fair)30 court trial.31 
But according to what justice? It seems that the belief that “judicial applica-
tion of law means that judges administer justice according to the law in force, and 
for this reason they also abide by law”32 is deeply rooted.
Zygmunt Ziembiński writes: “The official system of justice is implemented 
according to what everyone deserves by law. Therefore, the content of law de-
termines whether a decision is just or not. It means, therefore, that it functions 
like a blanket form […]”.33 It is often thus presupposed that just examination pro-
ceedings remain in accordance with the provisions of material and procedural 
law. It is, therefore, assumed that what is in accordance with law (i.e. the will of 
the legislative body expressed in legal regulations) is just – this is called legalist 
(formalist) justice. Justice understood in such a way can lead to negating or an-
nihilating its own essence. It does not guarantee its implementation according to 
the suum cuique tribuere principle (to each his own).
It is worth emphasizing that the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in its judge-
ment of 6 July 1999 (P2/99, OTK (Official Digest), 1999, No. 5, item 103), refer-
ring to the constitutional principle of justice, says that justice which “resides in 
eliminating lawlessness to be free of subjective interests and subjective form, as 
well as of accidental force, so that it could be a punishment and not a vengeance. 
Thus expressed, justice is stronger than law”.
Let us take into consideration that there are judgements of the Polish Con-
stitutional Tribunal in which it deems certain challenged provisions illegal, but 
allows for their assessment from the point of view of justice and then deems them 
unjust.34 In the relationship “legality” – “justice”35, we can find certain judgements 
30 In literature, various terms are used.
31 Cf. art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
32 R.A. Tokarczyk, Sprawiedliwość jako naczelna wartość prawa, „Państwo i Prawo” 1997, 
item 6, p. 12.
33 Z. Ziembiński, O pojmowaniu sprawiedliwości, Lublin 1992, p. 126. The author notes the 
blank-form nature of the “to each his own according to law” formula: “it allows the judge to wash 
their hands of the substantive content of the decisions, moving the responsibility onto the legislative 
body”. Ibidem.
34 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 9.01.1996 (K 18/95, OTK (Official Digest) 1996, 
No. 1, item 1).
35 Cf. also: S. Tkacz, Rozumienie sprawiedliwości w orzecznictwie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, 
Katowice 2003, pp. 69−84.
Wojciech Dziedziak





of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal where it deems an illegally made provision 
just: it deems the provision illegal, but considers its justice and deems it just in 
the categories of material justice, finally judging it unconstitutional.36 Of course, 
there are many judgements in which provisions that fulfil the Constitutional Tri-
bunal’s criteria of legality are deemed unjust and, as a result, unconstitutional. 
The Tribunal grants priority to material justice – whether it is distributive or rec-
tificatory – over legality. This alone indicates that justice is not identical with 
legality. 
Legalist (formal, legal) justice, in the sense of conformity with law, means 
that every law founds and measures justice. Therefore, law is a measure of justice, 
no matter what kind of law it is. We must reject such a legalist understanding of 
justice, linked to the positivist paradigm and based on the assumption that what is 
just is also consistent with the will of the legislative body expressed in the provi-
sions of statutory law. 
When considering equity and talking about axiological bases of the appli-
cation of law, we surely cannot thoughtlessly trust and rely on legalist justice, 
because it may lead and has often led to betrayal, degradation and annihilation of 
the essence of justice. We cannot implement legalist justice based on the letter of 
every act, every lex. 
In connection to the problem that we are deliberating on, we have to consider 
what Aristotle understood as justice in a broader, more general sense.37 In Nico-
machean Ethics, he wrote: “The just, then, is the lawful and the fair, the unjust the 
unlawful and the unfair”38. It is a fact that the Stagirite wrote: “[…] evidently all 
lawful acts are in a sense just acts; for the acts laid down by the legislative art are 
lawful, and each of these, we say, is just”. But later on, we can read: “[…] in one 
sense we call those acts just that tend to produce and preserve happiness and its 
components for the political society. […] This form of justice, then, is complete 
virtue, but not absolutely, but in relation to our neighbour. And therefore justice is 
often thought to be the greatest of virtues, and «neither evening nor morning star» 
is so wonderful; and proverbially «in justice is every virtue comprehended»”.39
In Politics, he claims: “[…] this is the political science of which the good is 
justice, in other words, the common interest”40.
36 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 28.05.1986 (U 1/86, OTK (Official Digest) 1986, 
item 2). Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 12.04.1994 (U 6/93, OTK (Official Digest) 
1994, item 8).
37 Aristotle analysed justice also in more narrow, more detailed sense, distinguishing “distribu-
tive justice (iustitia distributiva) and rectificatory justice (iustitia commutativa)”. Cf. Aristotle, Ni-
comachean ethics, p. 72.
38 Ibidem, p. 73. 
39 Ibidem. 
40 Aristotle, Politics, p. 68.
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Aristotle, writing “all lawful acts are in a sense just acts”, assumed that it is 
not law itself that is just. We can, therefore, say, that he meant not just any law, but 
the law that is shaped for “another’s good”41 and for common good. 
We have to emphasize, moreover, that the classic formula proclaims that we 
should “give to everyone his own according to law (ius)”42. The terms ius and lex 
were two different notions for the Romans – the difference between the acts of 
law and law was obvious.43 When explaining the meaning of the word ius, Ulpian 
derives the notion of law from justice. Iuri operam daturum prius nosse oportet, 
unde nomen iuris descendat. – Est autem a iustitia appellatum (“When a man 
means to give his attention to law (ius), he ought first to know whence the term ius 
is derived”). And it is derived from justice (iustitia).44 He also gives the following 
principles of law (praecepta iuris): honeste vivere (live uprightly), alterum non 
laedere (injure no man), suum cuique tribuere (give every man his due).45
We also have to emphasize that art. 2 of the Polish Constitution imposes on the 
organs of the state an obligation of implementing the principles of social justice. 
This obligation concerns not only lawmaking, but all organs, courts included. We 
are not talking about legalist justice, which assumes that what is in accordance 
with law is just. The obligation of implementing the principles of social justice 
has to be considered in connection with the universal value – justice as expressed 
at the beginning of the Preamble to the Polish Constitution. 
Now let us move on to human dignity (Latin: dignitas hominis). We are con-
sidering here the inherent, inalienable, indestructible dignity – personal dignity. 
Human dignity today is a category not only in philosophy or ethics, but also 
in law.46 The principle of protecting the inherent human dignity appears in inter-
national and national regulations. 
41 Aristotle claims: “justice, alone of the virtues, is thought to he «another’s good»”. Idem, 
Nicomachean ethics, p. 73.
42 Sometimes this expression is translated as “to give each what he justly deserves”. Cf. 
M. Kuryłowicz, Etyka i prawo…, pp. 127−128. The well-known definition mentioned above can 
also be translated as follows: justice is the constant and invariable will of awarding everyone the 
right (ius) that he deserves. 
43 Cf. W. Dajczak, T. Giaro, F. Longchamps de Bérier, Prawo rzymskie. U podstaw prawa pry-
watnego, Warsaw 2009, p. 44.
44 Ulpian, Digesta, 1, 1, 1 pr.
45 Cf. Ulpian, Digesta, 1, 1, 10, 1. On the validity of these principles of law. Cf. M. Jońca, 
Prawo rzymskie. Marginalia, Lublin 2012, pp. 17−18.
46 In the most general sense, we can distinguish four concepts of human dignity: theological, 
philosophical, legal and psycho-sociological. J. Messner enumerates four aspects of human dignity: 
theological, metaphysical, ethical and ontological. Cf. J. Messner, Was ist Menschenwürde?, „Inter-
nationale katholische Zeitschrift” 6 (1977), No. 3, p. 239.
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Dignity is the foundation of human rights, the basis and the source of all hu-
man rights and their protection.47 In the Polish Constitution, the principle of hu-
man dignity is expressed in art. 30, which states: “The inherent and inalienable 
dignity of the person shall constitute a source of freedoms and rights of persons 
and citizens. It shall be inviolable. The respect and protection thereof shall be 
the obligation of public authorities”. The Preamble also summons those who im-
plement the Constitution “to do so paying respect to the inherent dignity of the 
person”.48
The principle of inherent dignity stresses the super-positive, and thus superior 
to the Constitution, principle of human dignity.49 Dignity is fundamental and inde-
pendent from positive legal regulations, independent from the will of the legisla-
tive body. It is not awarded and cannot be taken away through any human action 
or influence of public authorities.
Art. 30 of the Polish Constitution refers to the solutions adopted in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights.50 The principle of dignity is expressed by 
numerous regulations51, among them art. 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union, which says: “Human dignity is inviolable. It must be re-
spected and protected”.52 In the Preamble to the Charter, we can read: “Conscious 
of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, uni-
versal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity […]”. The term 
appears also in the constitutions of certain states.53
47 Cf. W. Dziedziak, op. cit., pp. 29−32.
48 Cf. Preamble to the Polish Constitution.
49 This provision constitutes a natural legal justification for rights and freedoms included in the 
Constitution.
50 The Declaration was adopted by 48 votes in favour, but it is symptomatic that ex-Communist 
states, including Poland, abstained from voting. The mere title of the document – Declaration – 
suggests that the rights expressed therein exist in reality and the content is of a declaratory and not 
constitutive nature. The Declaration does not stipulate human rights, it only confirms, declares them. 
However, the legal binding force of the Declaration is an object of disputes. Usually it is assumed 
that it is not binding, but there are different opinions. Cf. on the topic: K. Motyka, Prawa człowieka. 
Wprowadzenie. Wybór źródeł, Lublin 2001, pp. 34−35.
51 For example, the International Covenants on Human Rights of 16 December 1966 assume 
that human rights result from inherent human dignity. Cf. The Introduction to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Introduction to International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights.
52 According to the explanatory report to the Charter (cf. Explanatory Report to the Charter, 
Charte 4473/00 of 11 October 2000) art. 1 derives fundamental rights from personal dignity and 
constitutes it as a real source of these rights. Moreover, according to the Report, none of the rights 
inscribed in the Charter can be used to assault personal dignity. This dignity has to be respected, 
even if the given right is subject to limitations. The principle of respect for dignity is the foundation 
of a catalogue of fundamental rights (chapter 1 of the Charter is entitled “Dignity”).
53 E.g. art. 1 of the 1949 German Constitution, art. 1 of the 1976 Portuguese Constitution, art. 
10 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution. 
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Personal dignity is the foundation for recognizing every human being, every 
person as an end in itself, and never as a means. This is linked to the interdiction 
of instrumental treatment.54
From dignity result inalienable norms that cannot be modified by any regime 
or legislation. 
The Polish Constitutional Tribunal has repeatedly referred to the principle of 
human dignity, stressing, among others, that it is: “[…] a transcendental value 
which is primeval to other human rights and freedoms (for which it is a source), 
inherent and inalienable […]”55, that it constitutes “the foundation for the whole 
state’s legal order”56, and that it is absolutely forbidden to breach it.57 It empha-
sized also that “it is the only right with which it is impossible to use the principle 
of proportionality”.58 In the explanation of the judgement of 15 October 2002 (SK 
6/02, OTK (Official Digest) 2002, series A, No. 5, item 65) the Constitutional 
Tribunal stated that “human dignity can be treated as a spontaneous constitutional 
model, also in the case of a constitutional infringement”. It also stressed that: “Hu-
man dignity mentioned in art. 30 of the Constitution serves several functions in 
the constitutional order: a link between the Constitution (an act of positive law) 
and the natural law order; a determiner for the interpretation and application of 
the Constitution; an indicator of the system and the range of particular rights and 
freedoms […]”.
In the conclusion, we have to affirm that dignity is an objective category. It is 
an absolute, permanent and indestructible value, which should be regarded as the 
“right to rights”. 
3. ROLE OF EQUITY IN THE PROCESSES 
OF APPLICATION OF LAW
We need to emphasize that if the process of arriving at a legal resolution, or of 
implementing law, does not take good, justice and human dignity into account, it 
simply says “no” to humans. In other words, such a structure or a machine is not 
concerned with humans or with common good. 
54 The thoughts of human dignity were excellently put by I. Kant in his famous imperative: 
“Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become 
a universal law without contradiction”. I. Kant, Grounding for the metaphysics of morals, trans. 
J.W. Ellington, Indianapolis [1785] (1993), p. 30.
55 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 5.03 2003 (K 7/01, OTK (Official Digest) 2003, 
series A, No. 3, item 19).
56 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 4.03 2001 (K 11/00, OTK (Official Digest) 2001, 
No. 3, item 54).
57 Ibidem.
58 Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 5.03 2003 (K 7/01, OTK (Official Digest) 2003, 
series A, No. 3, item 19).
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Using the meaning of the word “equity” considered in this paper, we can say 
that every decision in the application of law should be equitable. The person who 
applies law should bear equity in mind. The idea of equitable resolution or deci-
sion, notably in the judicial application of law, should be inscribed in the very 
ethos of the judge’s function. After all, courts are the bodies that implement jus-
tice. A just judge has to pass equitable judgements. 
In the application of law, the role of equity is linked to the requirement of 
passing an appropriate, suitable, individual judgement. The equity of the decision 
has to be specific – it can be an “improvement of law” in the sense of its practi-
cal materialization. After all, we are not talking about an unjust judgement that 
conforms to the letter of law. A judgement, if necessary, can also be a tool which 
allows us to repair or improve law, as well as oppose or disobey legal acts.
Specific equity in the application of law leads to individualized, detailed jus-
tice and can complement material justice. Equity always strives to achieve full 
justice in the act of application of law. It is, therefore, the fullest, the most promi-
nent form of justice. Equity allows us to choose the formula of justice that would 
allow us to “give to each his due”. We can, therefore, say that equity “disambigu-
ates” material, individualized justice and leads to a resolution that gives to each 
his “equitable” due.
Equity in concreto is the “just thing itself”, the judgement which is just here 
and now, one which is the best or at least better than all the other ones. 
It seems that in every situation there is a possibility to make an equitable deci-
sion, one that is based on real, actual facts, takes into consideration human and 
common good, justice and dignity of its addressees. When the basis of the judge-
ment is the fully established objective truth in its classic sense, at which the court 
aims, the equitable decision will be the only appropriate one – simply the best one. 
And if the basis of the judgement is the so-called judicial truth (if it does not harm 
the parties in the trial and if the parties agree with it), an equitable decision will be 
better than other ones with such arrangements made. However, it will not be the 
only equitable decision, unless the judicial (formal) truth corresponds to objective 
(actual) truth, which cannot be excluded.
Equity, as it has been mentioned earlier, in the acts of the application of law 
can be a remedy to wrong, dishonourable, unfair content of law, a means to pre-
vent the need to recall the saying summum ius summa iniuria. This is when the 
need arises to refer to higher values, to equity.59 We have to agree with Zygmunt 
59 In the case of Gesetzliches Unrecht, the judge or the official is obliged to choose, according 
to the postulates of equity, such a norm of judgement that a just and rational legislative body, guided 
by good and respect for human dignity, would legislate for the particular category of factual states 
to which the given casus belongs. Therefore, when the letter of law is appallingly unjust, undigni-
fied, is a form of lawlessness, the one to apply it has to, in a way, replace the legislative body so as 
not to enter into a conflict with the obvious content of moral norms and with his own conscience. 
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Ziembiński, who writes: “[…] there are some limits to the unjustness of law that, 
when overstepped, prevent the decent judge from being guided by the formula 
«to everyone his own according to law». There is a limit beyond which there is 
only the non possumus declaration, regardless of whether it may lead the judge to 
disrupt his professional career or even face repressions”.60
However, even when law (legal institutions and provisions) is equitable in its 
content, “equitable in itself”, certain “tensions” can appear between the general 
nature of law and individual nature of the cases, because the norms are general 
and abstract in their nature. Here, the role of equity in its traditional sense is em-
phasized. In this paper we assume a fuller understanding of this concept. It is the 
question of the classical epieikeia, considered by Aristotle. For him, such a cat-
egory was a necessary correction to statutory law and could also fill in the legal 
loopholes, taking into consideration the general nature of norms. In the fifth book 
of Nicomachean Ethics, he wrote: “The same thing, then, is just and equitable61, 
and while both are good the equitable is superior. […] the equitable is just, but not 
the legally just but a correction of legal justice. […] When the law speaks univer-
sally, then, and a case arises on it which is not covered by the universal statement, 
then it is right, where the legislator fails us and has erred by over-simplicity, to 
correct the omission – to say what the legislator himself would have said had he 
been present, and would have put into his law if he had known”.62 Epieikeia was 
the subject of Aristotle’s deliberations also in Rhetoric: “Equity63 bids us […] to 
think less about the laws than about the man who framed them, and less about 
what he said than about what he meant […]”.64 Aristotle indicates also the func-
tions of equity in the interpretation of the law. 
4. WAYS OF ACHIEVING THE EQUITABLE JUDICIAL DECISION 
If the mere content of law and legal norms, fulfils the requirements of justness, 
it is certainly a perfect basis leading to the equitable decision, although it does not 
determine whether the decision will be equitable or not. Coming to an equitable 
decision can be hindered, generally, by two types of factors: the generality of legal 
norms and the human factor – the body that applies law. 
An alternative for the official disobedience to an unjust law, which takes the form of acting so as to 
remove legal loopholes, is also a voluntary (sometimes even ostentatious) resignation from the posi-
tion correlated with the application of law.
60 Z. Ziembiński, O pojmowaniu…, p. 129.
61 In some translations of Aristotle’s works, the notion of righteousness is used rather than 
equity. However, in literature, the word epieikeia is very often translated and understood as equity.
62 Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, pp. 88−89.
63 The use of the word “righteousness” in some of the translations does not change the fact that 
traditionally, epieikeia is translated as equity. 
64 Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. W.R. Roberts, Book I, Hazleton 2010, p. 65. 
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How to aim at an equitable decision? Let us deliberate on it on the basis of the 
decision model of the judicial application of law. 
In logical order, the first decision in the model is the one that establishes fac-
tual circumstances.65 The establishing of facts in accordance with the reality (the 
principle of objective truth) is the starting point of an equitable decision. The court 
is obliged to reach the truth. It has been emphasized many times by the Polish Su-
preme Court. Both in the criminal procedure and in the administrative procedure, 
the principle of material (objective, actual) truth is obligatory.66 The judge and the 
court in legal (criminal) procedure have to search for the truth of the situation. 
They have to aim at gaining an appropriate knowledge of the reality that would 
give them the possibility to find an adequate resolution.
In criminal procedure, the principle of material truth is considered to be 
the paramount, key principle.67 When passing a judgement, the judge adjudicates 
the truth and establishes its consequences. Basing on truth, they administer justice.
However, we know that the requirement of material truth in civil procedure is 
not absolute. Moreover, there might appear elements of “judicial cognition” that 
limit the epistemological dimension of truth.68
Moreover, we need to emphasize that at the stage of establishing the factual 
circumstances, an axiological modification guided by equity can take place. Let us 
call it a “spontaneous equitable correction”.
The way of expressing facts in legal norm is also important. These facts can be 
given not only in a descriptive form, but also in a comparative or assessing form. 
The facts in the second group are the source of a margin of decision. This margin 
can be influenced by equity. In a way, the establishment of facts merges with their 
evaluation - there appear estimations, e.g. “material reasons”, “irretrievable and 
complete breakdown of marriage”, “reasonable cause”, “special circumstances”.69 
Some examples of fact names in which the assessing quality is emphasized are: 
“moral damage”, “strong agitation justified by circumstances”, “acting with […] 
in view”. In such situations, it is possible to use the “spontaneous equitable cor-
rection”. Estimations and evaluations can play the role of equity, because they are 
linked to “valuation”, referring to axiology. Thus, for example, not any reason, but 
65 We have to agree with M. Zieliński, who writes: “The question of being obliged to learn the 
facts that constitute the so-called factual basis of the resolution in legal proceedings is so obvious 
that even without any direct provision, indicating such an obligation to the judge, it would not give 
rise to any doubts in the light of the doctrine and the practice”. M. Zieliński, op. cit., p. 35.
66 Art. 2 § 2 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 7 of the Polish Code of Administra-
tive Procedure.
67 A. Sakowicz emphasizes that some treat it on par with other principles. Cf. K.T. Boratyńska, 
A. Górski, A. Sakowicz, A. Ważny, Kodeks postępowania karnego. Komentarz, Warsaw 2012, p. 17.
68 Cf. A. Korybski, L. Leszczyński, A. Pieniążek, op. cit., pp. 154−155. Cf. also: L. Leszczyń-
ski, Stosowanie generalnych klauzul odsyłających, Cracow 2001, pp. 152−153.
69 Cf. L. Leszczyński, Stosowanie generalnych…, p. 154.
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a “material reason” is an element of the factual circumstances. Only the “irretriev-
able and complete breakdown of marriage”, not just any breakdown, is an element 
of the factual circumstances established in the decision process.70 The existence 
of the fact of “acting under strong agitation justified by circumstances” demands 
establishing the state of strong agitation and issuing a justifying judgement.
Let us now move on to the validation decision, which establishes the norma-
tive basis71 for the decisions in the application of law. In the statutory legal system, 
in principle, the starting point for establishing the legal circumstances are provi-
sions of material law. 
First of all, the role of equity can be linked to the choice of a particular pro-
vision. Second of all, reaching equity can mean that we have to take into con-
sideration the equitable reference clauses (equitable clauses and other equitable 
references). Such clauses refer to the principles of equity, the considerations of 
equity or directly to the equity itself.72 The element of equity can appear in differ-
ent configurations: “legitimate interest of the citizens”73, “equitable damages”.74 
However, even now there is a problem with understanding such clauses in a full 
and certain way. We can use other clauses as auxiliaries75, e.g. good faith, good 
practice, principles of community coexistence (still as a substitution)76, good of 
the humans, good of the children, good of the family. In other legal orders, some 
examples of auxiliary constructions could be clauses of natural legal principles77, 
principles of natural law78, principles of reasonableness and equity.79
70 Cf. idem, Zagadnienia teorii stosowania prawa. Doktryna i tezy orzecznictwa, Cracow 2001, 
p. 69.
71 We assume, of course, that the competence and procedural bases (general and detailed norms) 
have been fulfilled by the entity that applies law. 
72 For example art. 4172 of the Polish Civil Code, art. 7612 of the Polish Civil Code, art. 7643 
§ 1 of the Polish Civil Code, art. 827 § 1 of the Polish Civil Code, art. 614 § 3 of the Polish Family 
and Guardianship Code, art. 1194 § 1 of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure.
73 Art. 7 of the Polish Code of Administrative Procedure. 
74 Art. 21 section 2 of the Polish Constitution. 
75 We can assume that different clauses with various names can be the way to the specific equity 
if they refer to moral criteria. 
76 This clause was meant to be a functional counterpart to equity in the Polish socialist system. 
It was introduced for ideological reasons, it was a tool of “ideologization of law”. Of course, it 
concerned the socialist principles of morality. Its introduction was a reception of Soviet solutions. 
The postulate to return to the traditional clauses, rooted in the European culture, is fully justified. 
77 § 7 ABGB of 1811 (natürliche Rechtsgrundsatzen).
78 Art. 16 of the Portuguese Civil Code of 1867 (principles of natural law).
79 Art. 3:12 of the Dutch Civil Code of 1992 (redeliikheid en billijkheid).
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Also the principles of social justice clause refers to moral values.80 This clause, 
along with the common good clause, is of special significance in the process of 
reaching equity.
While recapitulating these draft deliberations on reference clauses, and at the 
same time enlarging the perspective to include extrajudicial (administrative) ap-
plication of law, we have to emphasize that in the application of law, when aiming 
an equitable decision, a special part should be played by the following reference 
meta-clauses: common good (art. 1 of the Polish Constitution), principles of so-
cial justice (art. 2 of the Polish Constitution), legitimate interest of the citizens 
(art. 7 of the Polish Code of Administrative Procedure).81 These meta-clauses give 
an axiological dimension to every decision and nothing can prevent us from refer-
ring to them. The universality of their role in the decision processes requires wider 
axiological deliberations while taking individual decisions. These clauses can be 
an excellent way to achieve an equitable resolution.
Let us emphasize that reference clauses can play a deciding role in validation.
Thirdly, bases for decisions may be sought in the constitutional meta-princi-
ples of law – from the perspective of equity, the most important are the principle 
of common good (art. 1 of the Polish Constitution), the principle of social justice 
(art. 2 of the Polish Constitution) and the principle of the inherent and inalienable 
dignity of the person (art. 30 of the Polish Constitution). The aforementioned prin-
ciples have to be treated as applying to the whole legal system.
Fourthly, aiming at an equitable decision can be linked to a direct application 
of international law, including the principles of the said law that are connected to 
moral criteria.82
Fifthly, in the argumentation for the creation of a normative basis, we can use 
“axiological creation” from legal principles, including the principles of the whole 
legal system (constitutional principles). The aforementioned principles expressed 
in art. 1, art. 2 and art. 30 of the Polish Constitution may be crucial. These prin-
ciples constitute the core of meta-axiology of the Polish Constitution, and it is 
worth adding that this meta-axiology on this level is coherent.
Sixthly, other, earlier decisions in the application of law could be a compli-
mentary element (the per rationem decidendi argument). The decisions concerned 
are those of both national and international courts. 
80 Art. 2 of the Polish Constitution. It is necessary to emphasize that in jurisprudence it is 
claimed that: “The principles of social justice clause resembles slightly the principles of equity 
clause, typical of the private law”. L. Leszczyński, Tworzenie generalnych klauzul odsyłających, 
Lublin 2000, p. 76.
81 A similar role can be played, still as a substitute, by the principles of community coexistence 
clause (art. 5 of the Polish Civil Code).
82 Cf. L. Leszczyński, Stosownie generalnych…, p. 134.
Axiological Basis for the Application of Law – a Perspective of the Equitable Law





As for the subsequent decision (the interpretation decision), the body that 
applies law at the stage of interpretation83 has a smaller or larger, often hidden, 
degree of freedom.84 It has a certain “axiological autonomy”. The principles of ex-
egesis include tools, instruments and ways of axiological correction of the letter of 
law. They are activated to prevent making unjust and thus inequitable decisions. 
Among such principles, the most important are the principles of purpose and func-
tion85, the principles of system axiology86, as well as the principles of open axiolo-
gy.87 Dynamic interpretation of law might be of great significance. 
Practical interpretation forces the person applying law to enter into a rela-
tionship with reality, both in the social dimension (a specific given case, often 
a dispute, is adjudicated) and the legal dimension (interpretation of law not in 
abstracto, but for a practical use). These dimensions are linked to the axiological 
dimension, aiming at equity in its very bases.
The mere act of decoding the norms from legal provisions, or building a mod-
el of behaviour from various elements included in a legal text, is naturally linked 
to margins of decision.
It can happen that the factual situation leads to a modification of the interpreta-
tion in the sense of using a “different norm” than the one initially assumed.
In exceptional cases, the judge, using his margin of decision, can adjust the 
meaning of provisions through interpretation to such an extent that the facts will 
not be regulated by a given provision, but a different one. As a consequence, they 
can present a different legal classification of the factual circumstances. 
It is necessary to emphasize that as early as at the stage of linguistic inter-
pretation we can consider the axiology of the system (the principles of law) and, 
through it, slightly correct the meaning.88
The judges should have the ability to notice the values hidden behind the 
meaning of the letter of law. They can seek the sense of law, apart from the word-
ing of provisions, or extract the content that has the characteristics of equity, if 
law contains them.
83 We assume that interpretation takes place every time, regardless of the interpreter’s initial 
belief on the clarity of the object of interpretation. Cf. on the topic: A. Kalisz, L. Leszczyński, B. Li-
żewski, Wykładnia prawa. Model ogólny a perspektywa Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka 
i prawa Unii Europejskiej, Lublin 2011, pp. 25−26.
84 Cf. Z. Ziembiński, Wstęp do aksjologii dla prawników, Warsaw 1990, p. 208.
85 The principles of purpose and function, broadly speaking, refer to the purpose or the function 
of a regulation.
86 The principles of system axiology refer to the axiology of the legal system. They concern the 
use of legal principles for interpretation, as well as the use of the axiological coherence of a legal 
system. Cf. L. Leszczyński, Zagadnienia teorii…, pp. 129−130.
87 We consider here the criteria of open (extralegal) axiology which, if used, would mean the 
necessity to use equitable reference clauses. 
88 A. Kalisz, L. Leszczyński, B. Liżewski, op. cit., p. 42.
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The role of equity is sometimes linked to using the remedial interpretation. 
Here, the “axiological remedial role” of interpretation is especially important. In-
terpretation should be conducted in such a way that it does not permit appalling 
injustice, and thus an inequitable decision. The court is expected to be just, and 
justice is a part of equity.
The Polish Supreme Court in the resolution of 22 March 2007 said: “Linguis-
tic interpretation cannot […] lead to a resolution that in the light of commonly 
accepted values has to be deemed appallingly inequitable, unjust, irrational or 
destructive to the rationem legis of the interpreted provision”.89 In a similar situ-
ation, in the judgement of 8 July 2004, the Polish Supreme Court said: “[…] the 
directives of the purpose interpretation demand that in the process of establishing 
the meaning of a norm, its axiological context has to be taken into account. In the 
process of establishing the meaning of a norm, the commonly accepted principles 
of equity and justice have to be taken into consideration”.90
Law has to be interpreted with the constitutional principles and meta-values in 
view. We can say that it is a pro-constitutional interpretation.91 Meta-axiological 
foundations of law, meta-principles of law that constitute the general principles 
– these are the factors that draw the general shape of axiological choices. Pro-
constitutional interpretation that refers to the meta-axiology of the Polish Consti-
tution92 is a straight way to an equitable decision.
Principles and clauses can overlap, support and reinforce each other. This is 
linked to values, intra-legal axiology and external values. A reinforcement of the 
content of a decision concerning the application of law by the criteria of refer-
ence clauses, criteria of legal principles, and especially constitutional principles 
expressed in art. 1, art. 2 and art. 30 can take place.
We have to emphasize that the use of the equity criterion can change the model 
order in which the interpretation principles are used, thus moving the axiological 
arguments to the initial stage of the interpretation.
As for the subsumptive decision, it might seem that the role of equity is not of 
great importance. However, it is not always the case. At this stage, a comparison 
of the established factual circumstances with the reference clause criteria or the 
principles of law that constitute an element of the normative basis for the decision 
89 Polish Supreme Court resolution of 22.05.2007 (III CZP 8/2007).
90 Polish Supreme Court judgement of 8.07.2004 (IV CK 520/03).
91 Of course, only when the fundamental values on which equity is based are expressed in the 
Constitution.
92 Meta-axiology of the Polish Constitution can be built on the universal values enumerated in 
the Introduction: truth, justice, good, beauty, as well as common good (art. 1 of the Polish Constitu-
tion), principles of social justice (art. 2 of the Polish Constitution) and the principle of dignity of the 
person (art. 30 of the Polish Constitution).
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can take place. It is possible to classify the factual circumstances basing only on 
equitable criteria. 
The decision that establishes legal effects (the final decision) is the next stage 
in the process of the application of law. The influence of equity on this stage can 
be twofold. Firstly, it may be that the criteria of equity lead to non-application of 
the consequences that were predicted in the norms. Sanctions established in the 
norms have to yield to the important arguments of equity. Secondly, the criterion 
of equity can influence the choice of consequence type or the scope of legal ef-
fect if they are gradable. It concerns not only the sanctions as they appear in the 
criminal law, but also those in the civil law (e.g. the amount of compensation) or 
in the administrative law.93
While taking into consideration the criteria of equity (be it intra-legal, intra-
systemic or external ones), it seems that sometimes what constitutes the basis 
of the application of legal sanctions are moral sanctions. They also correct legal 
sanctions. 
Of course, the axiological (equitable) argumentation has to be strongly reflect-
ed in the justification of the decision. After all, the decision has to be “accepted” 
as equitable. 
Thus, the general ways of reaching an equitable decision were presented. 
5. CONCLUSION
In the conclusion, we may state that in the application of law, the most basic 
question is: how should a decision be made? Of course, the most mature form of 
application of law is its judicial application. So, how should a court issue deci-
sions, on what values should it be based (and how to fulfil them), what is and what 
should be the aim of a decision?
The answer to these questions is: equity, the equity of the decisions, equity in 
concreto. 
We have to state that the courts have a wide margin of freedom in the applica-
tion of law. It should be used “with their eyes set upon equity”, which is, let us 
recall, built on the following values: truth, good, justice, human dignity.
In the judicial application of law, the final decision, touches, in fact, the prin-
cipal, basic values and judgements (it touches truth, good, justice and human dig-
nity) if we reduce the subsequent reasoning and explanations. The legal effect 
established in the final decision always concerns a human, directly or indirectly.
Therefore, when talking about axiological bases of the application of law, we 
need to find a way which would take us to the best resolution. The court and the 
judge solve, after all, a certain case that exists in reality, and do not present alter-
93 Cf. L. Leszczyński, Stosowanie generalnych…, s. 164.
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native possibilities of choice. The court, while making a decision, makes a choice 
which should be driven by equity. After all, can we find any other values that 
would light our way? The judge should strive to find an equitable resolution, they 
should search for it and not reject it a priori. 
It is also necessary to refer to the assumptions that the judicial application of 
law is concerned with, above all, finding an equitable resolution. What is, there-
fore, the relationship between justice and equity? Justice, as it results from our 
deliberations, constitutes part of equity.
We can say that justice is the pillar of equity, but equity is richer and greater. 
Justice, when driven by truth, good and respect for dignity, does allow for giving 
to each “his own”. If the decision in its nature is just, it is also equitable. There-
fore, equity protects the formula suum cuique from being deformed. It fulfils it 
and does not allow for its degeneration and perversion. 
And one more remark: equity does not postulate arbitrariness of judicial 
judgements and decisions, but rather opposes it. 
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SUMMARY
This paper addresses the issue of axiological foundations of law enforcement in the short equity 
law. The law is surface mounted right on the values essential, primary, which are: truth, goodness 
and justice. Such an understanding of the validity refers to both the law-making process and its ap-
plication. With regard to the application of the law in the study focuses mainly on his judicial type, 
in which the court deciding specific, real situation is to take the right decision.
STRESZCZENIE
W artykule zostało podjęte zagadnienie aksjologicznych podstaw stosowania prawa w per-
spektywie prawa słusznego. Podstawy takie powinny być jasne, pewne, solidne, trwałe i takie daje 
właśnie teoria prawa słusznego. W opracowaniu wyjaśniono rozumienie prawa słusznego i warto-
ści je fundujących, a są nimi: prawda, dobro, sprawiedliwość, godność człowieka. Wartości te są 
aksjologicznymi podstawami bytu prawa, tj. wartościami leżącymi u źródeł procesów tworzenia 
prawa, ale w istocie są też (powinny być) zasadniczymi, podstawowymi wartościami stosowania 
prawa. W procesach stosowania prawa rola słuszności wiąże się z wymogiem wydania właściwe-
go, godziwego orzeczenia. Sądy w stosowaniu prawa dysponują sporym zakresem/marginesem 
swobody. Jego wykorzystanie powinno dokonywać się ze „wzrokiem skierowanym na słuszność”, 
bowiem ustalone w decyzji finalnej skutki prawne dotyczą zawsze człowieka (bezpośrednio czy 
pośrednio). Rola słuszności może wiązać się z „udoskonaleniem prawa” w sensie jego praktycznej 
konkretyzacji. Kategoria ta, gdy zachodzi taka konieczność, może być także narzędziem naprawia-
nia, poprawiania prawa, pozwala sprzeciwić się, wyjść poza posłuszeństwo ustawom, słuszność 
bowiem nie dozwala na podjęcie decyzji niesprawiedliwej. Słuszność spełnia też funkcję korektury 
stanowionego prawa, niwelującej napięcia między ogólnym charakterem prawa a indywidualnym 
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charakterem przypadków, mogącej też wypełniać luki w prawie. Słuszność w stosowaniu prawa jest 
zatem wartością korygującą – naprawiającą, udoskonalającą, uzupełniającą prawo i jednocześnie 
dopełniającą sprawiedliwość. W opracowaniu, w oparciu o model decyzyjny sądowego stosowania 
prawa, zostały ponadto przedstawione sposoby dochodzenia do decyzji słusznej. Sformułowano 
też pogląd o możliwości podjęcia jedynej słusznej decyzji. W konkluzji rozważań stwierdzono, iż 
wartości budujące słuszność, stanowiące zarazem aksjologiczne podstawy stosowania prawa, prze-
ciwstawiają się arbitralności ocen i decyzji sędziowskich.
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